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The Attack Doesn’t Come From One Direction Anymore

One group of attackers used a Teams message and a follow-up phone call to go after more than 150 employees at 10 or more companies this year, without starting from a phishing email. Here’s how multi-channel social engineering works, why it slips past defenses that watch one channel at a time, and five places to start.

By Tim Chase

Between January and April 2026, one group of attackers went after more than 150 employees at a minimum of 10 companies. Their first move wasn’t a phishing email. They sent a Microsoft Teams message posing as the IT help desk, followed up with a phone call, and talked people into opening a remote-access session, according to Unit 42. During those same four months, lures sent through collaboration tools grew from 30% to 42% of the phishing alerts Unit 42 tracks.

We’re seeing more campaigns like this one. Attackers pick a pretext and run it through several channels at once, while most security programs are still set up to watch those channels one at a time.

What a multi-threaded campaign looks like

A multi-threaded, or multi-faceted, campaign takes one story and runs it through email, text, phone, chat, and the help desk at the same time. Each channel backs up the others. If you got an email about a security problem ten minutes ago, a call from IT about that same problem doesn’t seem strange.

Here is a common version. An employee’s inbox fills up with junk mail, or a fake security alert lands. Shortly after, someone from “IT” reaches out on Teams offering to fix it. Then the phone rings, and the caller patiently walks the employee through installing a remote tool or reading back an MFA code. None of those steps would trip an email filter or a SOC alert on its own.

Attackers also run it in reverse. They call the help desk pretending to be the employee, using details pulled from LinkedIn or old breach data, and ask for a password or MFA reset. In that case the employee and the help desk analyst are both targets in the same campaign.

Why it’s happening more often

Microsoft reports that weekly malicious Teams call attempts have grown about 80% since early 2026 and are now close to ten times their mid-2025 level. KnowBe4 data cited by Unit 42 shows Teams-based attacks up 41% from October 2025 to March 2026.

A big reason is cost. AI has made it cheap to write a believable message, clone a voice, or research a target, so running four channels now takes about the effort one used to. Email filters have also improved, which pushes attackers toward chat and phone, where controls are thinner and people tend to trust what they see.

The approach also has a track record. In 2025, Scattered Spider and ShinyHunters breached dozens of organizations, Google, Qantas and Allianz Life among them, mostly by phoning employees as IT support and getting them to approve a malicious Salesforce app (Obsidian). Salesforce’s own platform was never compromised in those attacks.

These crews are willing to put in the time, too. In incidents CyberProof investigated this year, attackers spent about 20 minutes on the phone with each target on average. In one healthcare case, they messaged five employees at once and worked with whoever answered.

Where most defenses fall short

Most organizations defend each channel on its own. The email gateway handles email, the help desk follows its verification script, and the awareness program sends a phishing simulation each quarter and reports a click rate. All of those can work as designed while the campaign still gets through, because nobody is watching how the pieces connect.

Training has the same gap. Employees have heard for years to be careful with suspicious emails. Very few have practiced what to do when a confident caller from “IT” phones about the email they just got, and a low click rate won’t tell you who would give that caller an MFA code.

Where to start

You can’t block Teams or phone calls, so the goal is to make each step of the campaign harder to complete. Here is where I would start.

  1. Tighten up the help desk. It shows up in almost every one of these campaigns. Require out-of-band verification for password and MFA resets, and make it clear that analysts won’t get in trouble for slowing down a caller who is pushing hard.
  2. Limit external access. Where you can, restrict external Teams chat to tenants you know, and only allow remote-access tools such as Quick Assist for the people who need them.
  3. Tell employees how IT actually reaches them. If IT never cold-calls about malware, say so, and keep saying it. Once people know the rule, an unexpected call stands out.
  4. Test more than email. Add vishing and help desk tests to your phishing program, and aim them at the roles attackers go after most: help desk staff, finance, executive assistants, and admins with privileged access.
  5. Track what people do. Watch for unexpected MFA approvals, remote tool installs, and reports of suspicious calls. When someone takes a risky action, follow up with them directly and soon, then check whether the behavior changes.

A lot of our work at Fable sits here. We test employees across email, voice, and deepfake video, pick up risky behavior from security telemetry you already collect, and send the employe a short briefing right after the risky action.

Final thought

In the campaigns we looked at this year, the email was rarely the whole attack. It was the setup for a call, a chat, or a help desk ticket. A program that only tests the first message is going to miss most of what follows.